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THE CONSTITUTION AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
THE 2005 JUDGE WILLIAM H. KEADY LECTURE'
Justice James E. Graves, Jr.2
I. D-DAY AT THE SUPREME COURT
This day was going to be a day to remember. But noth-
ing-neither the weather, nor the headlines, nor the stars of
the preceding night-foretold the magnitude of the changes
the coming hours would bring. Before nightfall on this
Monday, the Pandora's box of race was going to be forced
open and terrifying vistas were going to assault the eyes of
men and women. And in the wake of this event, some men
were going to predict the imminent collapse of the Repub-
lic, while other men, viewing the same set of facts, were go-
ing to say that their eyes had seen the glory of the coming of
the Lord.
This day, in short, was going to change everything, or
almost everything, in the field of race relations. But-as-
toundingly-there was not one word of warning from the
soothsayers or the headlines, which spoke of old and there-
fore reassuring crises: the Mau Mau uprising in Africa, the
Dien Bien Phu struggle in Vietnam, the Army-McCarthy
hearings in Washington, D.C.
This day was Monday, May 17, 1954. On this day, as on
other days before and since, tens of thousands of good sub-
urbanites left their lily-white compounds in the Maryland
and Virginia suburbs and rode into the increasingly black
1. Delivered at Mississippi College School of Law, Jackson, Miss., on Oct. 24, 2005.
2. Justice James E. Graves, Jr. has served on the Mississippi Supreme Court since 2001. He
previously served as a circuit court judge for ten years. A graduate of Sumner Hill High School in
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University.
He has served as a staff attorney at Central Mississippi Legal Services. As a special assistant attor-
ney general, he was head of the Human Services Division of the Attorney General's Office. Just prior
to his service as circuit judge, he was director of the Division of Child Support Enforcement of the
Mississippi Department of Human Services. He was also engaged in the private practice of law for
more than three years.
His teaching experience includes serving as a teaching team member at Harvard Law School and as
a presenter at Stanford Law School as well as Jurist-in-Residence at Syracuse University School of Law.
Justice Graves has also taught as an adjunct professor at Jackson State University, Tougaloo College,
and Millsaps College.
Justice Graves has received numerous awards, including the National Bar Association's first Dis-
tinguished Jurist Award in 1996, the Judge of the Year Award in 1992 from the National Conference of
Black Lawyers, and the 2004 NAACP Legal Award.
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city of Washington to conduct the business of the U.S. gov-
ernment. It was a pleasant but cloudy day in Washington,
with temperatures in the seventies, and phalanxes of tour-
ists, armed with cameras, were mobilizing for assaults on the
Lincoln and Washington monuments. The tourists, the
monuments, the motorcades from Virginia and Maryland:
all this was ordinary and reassuring. In fact, everything con-
spired on this day to suggest that this was just another ordi-
nary Monday in the best of all possible worlds. The blacks
were quarantined in their legally appointed Jim Crow
schools, the benign and reassuring (to some) Dwight David
Eisenhower was in the White House, spring flowers were in
bloom, and there was no reason to believe that things would
not go on this way forever. There was, to be sure, one possi-
ble source of trouble-and that was the U.S. Supreme
Court, which met every Monday to announce decisions.
And, as a matter of fact, a Supreme Court decision on
school segregation was long overdue. But the decision had
been delayed and postponed so many times that it had
slipped out of focus in the public's mind.
If the public had forgotten, the press and the politicians
had not. For almost four months now, a handful of lawyers
and reporters had gathered every Monday at the Supreme
Court building in the hope that the decision would come on
that day. But the Mondays of January and February and
March and April passed without event. And it seemed at
first that Monday, May 17th, would go by in the same fash-
ion. In fact, reporters were told before the Court convened
that it "looks like a quiet day."
This was an illusion. But that did not become apparent
until late in the session, which started promptly at twelve
noon. Every seat in the high-ceilinged, marble-columned
courtroom was filled long before the opening gavel was
sounded. And although there had been no advance public
notice, several celebrities were on hand, including Attorney
General Herbert Brownell, former Secretary of State Dean
Acheson, and three of the top lawyers in the school segrega-
tion cases-George E.C. Hayes and James M. Nabrit of
Washington, D.C., and Thurgood Marshall, chief counsel of
the NAACP.
At twelve on the dot, the court marshal brought celeb-
rities and non-celebrities to their feet with a whack of his
gavel and announced, "The Honorable, the Chief Justice
and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the
United States!" With a flourish, nine black-robed men
strode through openings in the red velvet curtains and
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moved to a long mahogany bench, which sat on a marble
platform a foot or so above the floor. For the first time in
several weeks, veteran reporters noted, all nine justices
were in attendance. Associate Justice Robert Jackson was
recovering from a heart attack, but he had checked out of
the hospital that morning and dragged himself to court.
What was the meaning of this? The justices gave no sign.
They stood poker-faced behind their black leather swivel
chairs while the marshal intoned the traditional chant:
"Oyez! Oyez! Oyez!!! All persons having business
before the Honorable, the Supreme Court of the United
States, are admonished to draw near and give their atten-
tion, for the Court is now sitting. God save the United
States and this Honorable Court!"
The gavel sounded again. The justices and spectators
took their seats. All eyes turned now to Chief Justice Earl
Warren, who dominated the proceedings from his chair in
the center of the high bench. Warren, big-shouldered, sil-
ver-haired, bespectacled, was sixty-two years old. On his
immediate right sat the senior associate justice, Hugo Lafay-
ette Black, an Alabamian and former member of the Ku
Klux Klan who had become the court's most consistent de-
fender of civil liberties. At Warren's left sat another senior
justice and another Southerner, Stanley Reed, of Maysville,
Kentucky. To the left and right of these men, in descending
order of seniority, were Felix Frankfurter, a former Harvard
Law School professor; Robert Jackson, the former chief
counsel for the United States at the Nuremberg trials; Har-
old H. Burton, a former mayor of Cleveland, Ohio; Tom
Clark, a former attorney general; and Sherman Minton, a
former senator from Indiana.
The justices represented a broad spectrum of (white)
American life. Three (Black, Clark, Reed) were from the
South, two (Burton and Minton) were from the Midwest,
two (Jackson and Frankfurter) were from the Northeast,
and two (Warren and Douglass) were from the West. All,
with the exception of Burton and Warren, were Democrats,
and only two-Black and Douglass-had been conspicuous
in the advocacy of equal rights for blacks.
It was in and through these men that America ap-
proached its date with destiny. The approach was singularly
lacking in drama. The Court first disposed of routine busi-
ness, including the admission of 118 lawyers to the Supreme
Court bar. When at last that was done, Chief Justice War-
ren recognized Tom Clark, who announced and read the
Court's opinion in a case dealing with alleged monopolistic
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practices in the sale of milk in Chicago. Justice Douglass
followed with two routine cases involving negligence and
the picketing of retail stores.
All this was unbearably boresome, and the tourists who
had come to the Court in search of history and drama were
fidgeting and cursing themselves for their foolhardiness. At
this precise moment, at the low ebb of the proceedings, Earl
Warren picked up a document on his desk and said: "I have
for announcement the judgment and opinion of the Court in
No. 1, Oliver Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka."
It was 12:52 p.m., and a shiver ran through the room. At the
same time, clerk Harold Wiley slipped a note into a pneu-
matic tube that whisked it to the ground floor pressroom,
where bored reporters were lounging and sipping coffee.
Banning E. Whittington, the Court's press officer, extracted
the note, read it, and put on his suit coat. This was noted by
a number of reporters, including Louis Lautier of the Negro
Newspaper Publishers Association. "I thought," Lautier
said later, "he was going to say he was going to lunch." In-
stead Whittington said, as he ran out of the pressroom,
"Reading of the segregation decisions is about to begin in
the courtroom." The pressroom exploded, and the report-
ers scrambled for the courtroom with Whittington leading
the way.
As these events unfolded, bells started ringing in press-
rooms all over the world. The first public alert came from
Associated Press: Chief Justice Warren today began reading
the Supreme Court's decision in the public school segrega-
tion cases. The Court's ruling could not be determined
immediately.
Warren read this, his first major opinion, in a clear and
undramatic voice. He began by tracing the twisted paths
that brought America and one hundred years of American
history to the bar of justice. The paths that framed his
words began in slavery. They branched out then, crossed
and doubled back on one another before halting tempora-
rily at the Supreme Court, which ruled in the infamous
Dred Scott decision that black people had no rights in
America that white people were bound to respect. The
Civil War reversed that decision, and the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth amendments opened up new paths of contro-
versy which again led to the Supreme Court, which again
ruled in favor of reaction and injustice. The Fourteenth
Amendment said clearly that "no State shall make or en-
force any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
[VOL. 25:283
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deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." The Supreme Court in-
terpreted this language narrowly, ruling in Plessy v. Fergu-
son, an 1896 case, that laws requiring segregation were a
reasonable use of state police power.
There was also concern and speculation at the White
House. According to Warren's posthumously published
book, President Eisenhower made an indirect but unmistak-
able appeal to him on behalf of the Southern cause. This
was unconscionable and possibly illegal, but it was too trans-
parently clumsy and it came too late to affect the words Earl
Warren read on May 17.
We come then to the question presented: Does seg-
regation of children in public schools solely on the basis
of race, even though the physical facilities and other
"tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children of
the minority group of equal education opportunities?
We believe that it does.... We conclude that in the field
of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal"
has no place. Separate educational facilities are inher-
ently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and
others similarly situated for whom the actions have been
brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of,
deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The words, clear, firm, unequivocal, resounded in
the courtroom, evoking frowns, smiles, tears. Thurgood
Marshall leaned over and said to an aide, "We hit the
jackpot!"3
That was an excerpt from a book by Lerone Bennett, Jr., called Great
Moments in Black History.4 Only he could make the pronouncement of a
Supreme Court decision seem like an exciting event.
Thanks to the Mississippi Humanities Council and Mississippi College
for this opportunity to follow in the footsteps of an impressive group of
distinguished lecturers since 1990 when the Judge William Keady Lecture
Series was begun. I am honored by the invitation, humbled by the tower-
ing legacy of Judge Keady, and intimidated by the noted scholars among us
this evening.
Judicial independence has been defined as the freedom of the judiciary
to render justice fairly, impartially, in accordance with the law and the
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United States Constitution; without threat, fear of reprisal, intimidation, or
other influence or consideration.
Alexander Hamilton, one of the framers of the Constitution, wrote in
the Federalist #78 to defend the role of the judiciary in the constitutional
structure of government. He was emphatic that "'there is no liberty, if the
power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive pow-
ers.' . . . [L]iberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but
would have every thing to fear from its union with either of the other de-
partments ....
Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The
judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold
their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated
Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.6
This was clear evidence of an intention to insulate judges from the
public pressures that may, and indeed should, affect elected officials.
Courts are a venerable institution in our democracy.
The security of lifetime appointment and a guaranteed salary certainly
helps to insure an independent judiciary. However, those benefits apply
only to the federal courts. In Mississippi state courts we have judicial elec-
tions. For appellate courts, the terms are eight years and for trial judges,
four. So, while the issue of judicial independence is in the front of many
minds, particularly in light of the recent vacancies on the United States
Supreme Court, distinctions must be drawn when discussing that issue.
Challenges to judicial independence at the federal and state levels in-
clude the unwarranted criticism of the judges; single-issue campaigns
against sitting judges; inadequate funding of the judiciary; judicial recall
elections; proposed term-limit constitutional amendments; partisan delay in
confirmation of federal judicial nominees; threats of impeachment/calls for
resignation; and reductions in state and federal sentencing power and dis-
cretion. The implications of these challenges to our justice system are far
reaching, and they undermine court legitimacy and democratic ideals.
Let us first look at the decision in Brown v. Board of Education and
why it is so important in the context of a discussion of judicial indepen-
dence. Here is why it is so illuminating:
First, those justices, those nine white men from all over the country,
decided to do what was right. They did the right thing for the right reason.
Unfortunately, there are some people, even among today's judiciary, who
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (McLean's ed.) available at http://thomas.loc
.gov/home/histdox/fed_78.html (last accessed Oct. 17, 2006).
6. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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lack the courage and the conviction to do that. That act alone was coura-
geous when you consider the times. It was May 1954, a year and a half
before Rosa Parks's refusal to give up her seat on the bus gave birth to the
Civil Rights Movement. It was a unanimous decision. That is very hard to
do. Trust me. But those nine men recognized the importance of a united
front in such an important decision. Justice Robert Jackson left the hospi-
tal and dragged himself to the Court for the announcement. It was impor-
tant for our democracy that he be there. Justice Black was a former Ku
Klux Klansman from Alabama. It was significant that he too voted with
the majority.
Judicial independence-without fear of reprisal-Justice Black knew
that he would go home to Alabama. Absent any undue influence-accord-
ing to Chief Justice Warren's memoirs, President Eisenhower made an indi-
rect but unmistakable appeal on behalf of the Southern cause.7 That was
unconscionable and inappropriate, but it did not affect Justice Warren's
decision.
Unquestionably, there were some personal views that were set aside in
the interest of justice. In light of the Court's earlier precedent in Plessy v.
Ferguson, those justices were certainly labeled judicial activists. What was
then viewed by so many as activism is now highly praised as justice.
A judicial activist is any judge who makes a decision with which a very
vocal group, large or small, disagrees. However, there is today almost uni-
versal praise for the decision and almost universal disdain for the Jim Crow
system that compelled it. "Judicial activism" is usually associated with lib-
erals, but lately conservatives have been far more likely to strike down laws
passed by Congress.
Allow me to pause and say that I detest labels. Liberal, conservative,
or moderate; Republican, Democrat or Independent-I think labeling al-
lows people to presume that they know all that they need to know about a
person, based on the label. It allows people to avoid engaging in any in-
depth study, examination, or analysis. It makes convenient our tendencies
toward presumption and stereotype. With that in mind, I note that accord-
ing to Yale Law Professor Paul Gewirtz, Justice Clarence Thomas has
voted to invalidate sixty-five percent of the laws that have come before him
in cases, while those Justices least likely to do so were Ruth Bader Gins-
burg and Stephen Breyer. So I guess liberals, conservatives, and moderates
can all be activists.
There have been several major attempts throughout our history to in-
terfere with judicial independence. This is not a new issue. Judges are
often accused of being activists, unaccountable and out of the mainstream.
Life tenure should allow a judge to hear and benefit from informed criti-
cism from the bar, the other branches of government, and the public.
The historical attempts at interference include the case of Justice Sa-
muel Chase. He was on the Supreme Court in 1805 when the House voted
7. EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN (1977).
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to impeach him. The charges had to do with Chase's charge to a Baltimore
grand jury and with allegations that he had shown a high degree of imparti-
ality in two high-profile trials.
Chase was a Federalist who had been appointed by President George
Washington. But by 1805, Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans con-
trolled the Presidency and the Senate.
Although there were twenty-five Jeffersonian Republicans and nine
Federalists in the Senate, the Republicans failed to get the two-thirds vote
necessary to convict. The Senate's failure to convict was not an endorse-
ment of Chase, but instead was a recognition by the Senate that impeach-
ment should not be used to remove a judge for conduct in the exercise of
his judicial duties. That political precedent has governed the use of im-
peachment to remove federal judges ever since. That is as it should be.
Any other rule would destroy judicial independence-instead of trying to
apply the law fairly, regardless of public opinion, judges would be con-
cerned about inflaming any group that might be able to muster the votes in
Congress to impeach and convict them.
Historical aside: At Samuel Chase's trial, the Vice-President of the
United States and presiding officer of the Senate was Aaron Burr. Burr
was a dapper man with piercing black eyes. Although he sat as the presid-
ing officer of the impeachment court, he himself was a fugitive from justice.
Burr had recently killed Alexander Hamilton in a duel in New Jersey. An
indictment against him for murder was outstanding. Hence, someone re-
marked that although in most courts the murderer was arraigned before
the judge, in this court the judge was arraigned before the murderer!
Congress again confirmed this principle when it passed the Judicial
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980,8 which
authorized the filing of a complaint against a federal judge for misconduct
or disability affecting the judge's ability to discharge his/her duties. If the
charges are substantiated, then the judge may be subject to various kinds of
discipline short of removal from office. Congress made clear, though, that
the statute did not authorize complaints "directly relating to the merits of a
decision or a procedural ruling." The appellate process is the sole remedy
for challenges to decisions or rulings.
Another example of a historical attempt to interfere with judicial inde-
pendence is what Franklin D. Roosevelt attempted to do in the 1930s. The
Supreme Court had invalidated legislation that Roosevelt thought was es-
sential to restore prosperity during the Great Depression. Roosevelt, and
an overwhelmingly Democratic Congress, faced a Court that had for thirty
years been reading into our Constitution a doctrine of "freedom of con-
tract" that was unfriendly to social legislation.
In FDR's view, the Court was a roadblock to the progressive reforms
needed in the nation, and he planned to use his immense political resources
to bring it into step. Roosevelt proposed a plan to "reorganize" the judicial
8. Pub. L. No. 96-458 (1980), codified at 28 U.S.C. 332(a) & 28 U.S.C. 372.
[VOL. 25:283
2006] THE CONSTITUTION AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 291
branch by, among other things, appointing an additional six Justices. He
argued that the older Justices needed the additional help. Clearly, his in-
tent was to pack the Court with Justices who would be sympathetic to his
New Deal. Notwithstanding the huge majorities in both the House and the
Senate, the proposal failed. And it should have. It was a blatant assault on
judicial independence.
President Roosevelt eventually was able to change the judicial philoso-
phy of the Supreme Court. Through the appointment process and over the
course of his several terms in office, FDR appointed seven associate Jus-
tices and one Chief Justice. He changed the judicial philosophy of the
Court in a way that the framers of our Constitution intended-through the
appointment process.
The framers of our Constitution struck a balance between accountabil-
ity and judicial independence. Hence, judges have the security of lifetime
appointments, which are made by the executive branch with the advice and
consent of the legislative branch. In other words, elected officials who are
accountable to the public make the decisions regarding service in the judi-
cial branch. It is indeed a system that facilitates judicial independence.
The judicial independence of state courts is an entirely different mat-
ter, but not really. It is different because most states have elections for
state court judges. It is not different because citizens want justice in
whatever courts they find themselves, whether by chance or by choice.
However, in state court elections, the landscape has changed dramatically
in the last ten to fifteen years.
It was a lawsuit before Judge Keady in the early seventies that led to
massive changes in the conditions at Parchman. 9 David Oshinsky, in his
book Worse Than Slavery, describes Judge Keady's visits as follows:
Keady visited Parchman on four occasions, once taking
his minister along. Wandering through the cages, talking
privately to the inmates, he discovered an institution in
shambles, marked by violence and neglect. The camps were
laced with open ditches, holding raw sewage and medical
waste. Rats scurried along the floors. . .. At one camp,
Keady found "three wash basins for 80 men which consist of
oil drums cut in half." At all camps, he saw filthy bath-
rooms, rotting mattresses, polluted water supplies, and
kitchens overrun with insects, rodents, and the stench of
decay.
The convicts told him stories that supported [the claims
made in the suit]. Parchman was a dangerous, deadly place.
Shootings and beatings were common; murders went unre-
ported; the maximum security unit was a torture chamber.
Trusties brutalized inmates, who, in turn, brutalized each
9. The Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman, Miss.
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other. "One part of me had always suspected such things,"
the judge recalled. "The rest of me was angry and
ashamed."' °
Judge Keady required prison officials to protect inmates from physical
assaults by other inmates, stop housing them in barracks unfit for human
habitation, end racial discrimination against inmates, provide medical care,
and end other barbaric and patently unconstitutional practices. What a
perfect and comprehensive example of an independent judiciary.
Stephen Bright wrote in a Georgia State Law Review article that:
Federal courts had to enforce the Constitution in these
and other areas because the state courts simply were not
independent and did not enforce the law. A Georgia Su-
preme Court justice acknowledged that the elected justices
of that court may have overlooked errors, leaving federal
courts to remedy them via habeas corpus, because "(federal
judges) have lifetime appointments. Let them make the
hard decisions."'"
How much has changed since then. Mississippi still has judicial elec-
tions. And now more than ever before, special interest groups seek to se-
cure the election, not of fair and impartial judges, but judges who will
decide in their favor. From oil, tobacco, and pharmaceutical companies, to
the insurance defense bar, to prosecutors, to the religious right, to labor
unions, to the plaintiff's personal injury bar, to medical doctors and other
health care providers-all seek to control the courts and the judges. So a
judge can (a) try to please everybody, (b) try to please whoever has the
most money, (c) try to please whoever controls the most votes, or (d) try to
serve the interest of justice.
The answer is obvious-but not so fast. The Maxwell Poll reveals the
following:
Despite all the partisan squabbling over the courts, the
public has decidedly ambivalent views about the nature of
judicial decision-making and whether there should be more
political intrusion into the courts. These results come from
a nationwide survey done during October [2005] by the
Maxwell School at Syracuse University. Does the public
think that judges draw on their personal or partisan views,
do they think that there should be more political intrusion
10. DAVID M. OSHINSKY, WORSE THAN SLAVERY: PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM
CROW JUSTICE 251 (1997).
11. Stephen B. Bright, Can Judicial Independence Be Attained in the South? Overcoming His-
tory, Elections, and Misperceptions About the Role of the Judiciary, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 840 (citing
Katie Wood, Not Just a Rubber Stamp Anymore, FULTON COUNTYe DAILY REP., Jan. 25, 1993, at 1, 4).
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into the courts, and do they trust the process of selecting
judges?
When asked whether the partisan backgrounds of
judges influences their decisions, 42% say a lot, 44% say
some, and only 10% say not much at all. When asked if "in
many cases judges are really basing their decisions on their
own personal beliefs," 56% agree and only 36% disagree.
While there is an apparent majority that sees a signifi-
cant role for partisan and personal views, there is not a ma-
jority that is critical of the courts. When asked if the courts
are out of step with the American public, 47% agree and
44% disagree. When asked if judges should be shielded
from outside pressure, 73% agree. When asked if judges
should be more accountable to elected officials, 41% agree
and 54% disagree. There is no indication of a consensus to
intrude more. Further, the differences that do exist are not
reflective of a partisan split. Republicans and Democrats
agree in these responses.
Despite these responses and the partisan agreement
about these issues, the partisanship of Washington has
seeped into the process of selecting judges. When asked
how much they trust the President and the Senate to pick
good judges, only 20% say a lot and 31% say not much at
all. These responses differ significantly by party identifica-
tion. 8% of Democrats have a lot of trust, while 44% of
Republicans do. The courts are less of a problem to the
public than is the partisan process of selecting judges."2
II. CONCLUSION
Justice Rehnquist said in his remarks on judicial independence in
March 2003:
I suspect the Court will continue to encounter chal-
lenges to its independence and authority by the other
branches of government because of the design of our Con-
stitutional system. The degree to which that independence
will be preserved will depend again in some measure on the
public's respect for the judiciary. Maintaining that respect
12. Campbell Public Affairs Institute, Maxwell School of Syracuse University, Judges and the
American Public's View of Them: Results of the Maxwell Poll (Oct. 2005) available at http://www.max-
well.syr.edu/news/releases/051017-poll.asp.
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and a reserve of public goodwill, without becoming sub-
servient to public opinion, remains a challenge to the fed-
eral judiciary in the new millennium. 3
And I would add, to the state judiciary as well.
Chief Justice Francis Nyalali of the United Republic of Tanzania:
The people have to value an independent judiciary and
be willing to defend it. And to win public affection, we, the
judges, must do our jobs well. The courts must work. Peo-
ple must feel that they can resolve disputes satisfactorily
and in a reasonable amount of time. If they do, then the
people will support us. You see, it is really the quality of
justice that determines whether we remain independent."4
Judges and justices must conduct themselves, both in their on-court
activities and judicial decisions, and in their everyday lives, in a manner
that fosters public confidence in the judiciary. Unfortunately, there are a
few who pander to special interests and thereby lessen the public's confi-
dence in what is a venerable institution in our democracy. While the insti-
tutions are much larger and much more important than any of the
individuals among us who serve, it is important to remember that individu-
als can dilute the quality of justice handed down by these institutions. It is
important that those of us who serve seek to rise to the level of quality that
the citizens deserve and expect.
George Will once said that America's business is justice.
I want to thank you, the citizens, for entrusting me to handle
America's business. Godspeed.
13. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Remarks at the D.C. Circuit Judicial Conference: Reflec-
tions on the History and Future of the Supreme Court of the United States (June 16, 2000), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_06-16-00.html.
14. Jennifer Widner, Building Judicial Independence in Common Law Africa, paper presented to
the 93d Annual Meeting of the Am. Pol. Sci. Ass'n, Aug. 29, 1997.
[VOL. 25:283
